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LEASE DISPUTES

Calculation of Lease R oyalties

In Culpepper v. EO G Resources, Inc., EOG Resources, Inc. was the
successor-in-interest to the lessee's rights under a mineral lease that
required the lessee to pay a royalty on natural gas, calculated at three
sixteenths of the "amount realized by [l]essee computed at the mouth
of the well."1 EOG produced natural gas and sold it at a location
away from the well. In calculating the royalty it paid to the lessors,
EOG used the "work back" or "net back" method, in which transpor
tation costs incurred by the operator were deducted from the sales
price of the natural gas, with the royalty being paid on the difference.2
The lessors brought suit, arguing that deduction of transportation
costs was improper.3 The district court agreed and entered judgment
for the lessors, but the Louisiana Second Circuit reversed.4 Citing
prior jurisprudence, the appellate court stated that deduction of post
production costs is proper when calculating a royalty that is based on
the "amount realized . . . at the mouth of the well."5

B.

Commencement of Operations

In Cason v. Chesapeake Operating, Inc., Mr. and Mrs. Cason
granted a mineral lease that contained a five-year primary term that
expired on May 31, 2010.6 The lease contained a clause stating that
the lease would remain in effect beyond the primary term for as long
as the lessee was "engaged in operations for drilling."7 After multiple
assignments and partial assignments, a portion of the lease was held
by a subsidiary of Chesapeake Operating.8 The lessees did not spud a
well or obtain a drilling permit before the expiration of the primary
term, but prior to the end of the primary term, Chesapeake took steps
in preparation for drilling.9 For example, it conducted a survey of a
drill site. staked an area for the well pad, and began to clear trees
from the area.10 Several weeks after the end of the primary term,
Chesapeake spudded a well at the site and eventually complete d the
well.11
I. -�ee Culpepper v. EOG Res., Inc., 92 So. 3d 1142, 1143 (La. Ct. App. 2012).
2. See PATRICK H. MARTIN & BRUCE M. KRAMER, MANUAL OF 01L & GAs
Tt'RM� 597-98, 1067-68 (14th ed. 2009) (defining "netback method" and "work-back
valuation method").
3. Culpepper, 92 So. 3d at 1143.
4. Id. al 1142 .
.5. Id. al 1143.
son v. Chesapeake Operating, Inc., 92 So. 3d 436, 438 (La. Ct. App. 2012).

�: ��

8. Id. al 437.
9. Id. al 439.

Id.
11. See id. at 438-39.

10.
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But Mr. and Mrs. Cason granted a mineral lease to another com
pany for the same land and filed suit against Chesapeake and several
other defendants that held an interest in the original lease, seeking a
judgment that the original lease had terminated.12 The Casons con
tended that Chesapeake's activities prior to the expiration of the pri
mary term did not constitute "operations for drilling" and therefore
had not maintained the original lease beyond the primary term.13 The
district court disagreed and entered judgment for the defendants.14
The Louisiana Second Circuit affirmed.15 The appellate court cited
numerous prior cases in which Louisiana courts have held that spud
ding a well is not necessary in order for a company to be engaged in
"drilling operations" or for the company to have commenced "drilling
operations. "16 Instead, it is sufficient that a company has begun signif
icant work in preparation for drilling, such as moving lumber and
equipment onsite, building board roads, and staking a site.17
The Second Circuit stated that work of the type performed by Ches
apeake prior to the expiration of the primary term is sufficient to con
stitute "operations for drilling" if the work is done in good faith,
without undue delay, and that the work eventually leads to the drilling
and completion of a well.18 Whether an operator is in good faith is
judged in large part by its actions, such as whether it diligently works
to complete a well.19 Here, Chesapeake had completed the well with
out undue delay.20 Accordingly, the Second Circuit held that the dis
trict court had not abused its discretion in holding that Chesapeake's
acts of surveying, staking, and clearing were sufficient to constitute
"operations for drilling" and to maintain the lease.21
C.

Mineral Code Article 207 Attorney Fees

In Adams v. JPD Energy, Inc., Mr. and Mrs. Adams agreed to grant
a mineral lease to JPD Energy.22 They signed a lease form that pro
vided for a one-eighth royalty, but both the Adamses and JPD later
12. Id. at 438.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 440.
15. Id. at 446.
16. Id. at 442.
17. See id. at 441-42.
18. Id. at 442.
19. See id. at 441.
20. Id. at 443.
21. See id.
22. See Adams v. JPD Energy, Inc., 46 So. 3d 751, 752 (La. Ct. App. 2010). Ad
ams involved a dispute regarding the validity of a lease and was decided prior to the

time period covered in this Article. The case is discussed briefly as background for an
attorney's fee dispute involving the same parties, which was decided during the period
covered in this Article. See Adams v. JPD Energy, Inc., 87 So. 3d 161 (La. Ct. App.
2012), writ denied, 89 So. 3d 1194 (La. 2012).
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stated that the reference to a one-eighth royalty was erroneous.23 The
Adamses sued to rescind the lease based on fraud or error, claiming
that the parties had agreed to a one-fourth royalty.24 JPD asked the
court to reform the lease, stating that the parties had agreed to a roy
alty of one-fifth, not one-fourth as claime d by the Adamses.25 T he
.
.
district court held that the lease was null and v01d because the parties
"26 The
Louisiana Second
had failed to reach a "meeting of the minds.
Circuit affirmed.27
After holding that the lease was unenforceable, the trial court
awarded attorney's fees to the Adamses, relying on Mineral Code arti
cle 207 ,28 which authorizes attorney's fees if a lessee fails to timely
acknowledge the "expiration" of a lease.29 The Second Circuit re
versed the attorney's fee award, holding that the nullity of a lease is
not the same as the "expiration" of a lease because a mineral lease
that is declared null is deemed never to have existed.30
IL

UNITS FOR ULTRA DEEP FORMATIONS

Like other states, Louisiana generally applies the rule of capture.31
But, as in some other states, Louisiana law authorizes a regulatory
agency-in Louisiana, it is the Office of Conservation ("Office")-to
enter compulsory unitization orders that modify the rule of capture.32
Several statutes grant unitization authority to the Office for various
situations.
For example, Louisiana Revised Statute 30:9 authorizes the Office
to create drilling units and states that "[a] drilling unit, as contem
plated [therein], means the maximum area that can be efficiently and
economically drained by one well." 33 Louisiana Revised Statute 30:5
authorizes the Office to order pool-wide or field-wide units under cer
tain circumstances, if at least 75% of the royalty owners in the area
23. Adams, 46 So. 3d at 753.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 754.
27. Id. at 756.
28. LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 31:207 (2000). This provision under title 31 ma y b e
referred to as article 2 0 7 of the Mineral Code. See LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 31:1
(2000).
29. See Adams v. JPD Energy, Inc., 87 So. 3d 161, 164 (La. Ct. Ap p . 2012), writ
denied, 89 So. 3d 1194 (La. 2012).
30. Id.
31 . See, �.g., �arnard v. Monongahela Natural Gas Co., 65 A. 801, 802 (Pa. 1907);
Kelly v. Oh10 Oil C:o. 4 9 N.E. 399, 401 (Ohio 1897); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § § 31:8,
.
31:14 (2000) (cod1fymg the substance of the rule of capture); see also Frey v. Amoco
Prod. Co., 603 So. 2d 166, 178 (La. 1992) (referring to "rule of capture" by name).
32. See LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 30:9 (2007); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 30.lO(A)
(West, � est�aw through 2 �12 Reg. S�ss.). In Louisiana, forced pooling and compul
sory umt1zat1on orders ty�1�ally ar� issued simultaneously, and they often are refer
enced by courts and practitioners simply as "unitization " orders.
33. § 30:9.
.
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consent to unitization.34 Louisiana Revised Statute 30:5.1 authorizes
the Office to order pool-wide units, without the need f or consent of

75% of the owners in the area, but only if the pool is found at a depth
of at least 15,000 feet.35
Act 743 o f the 2012 Regular Session of the Louisiana Legislature
grants the Office additional unitization authority by enacting a new
section to the existing Louisiana Revised Statute 30:5.1.36 The new
section authorizes the Commissioner of Conservation ("Commis
sioner") to declare units up to 9,000 acres in size for "ultra deep struc
tures" that are anticipated to be encountered at a minimum depth of
22,000 feet, with such units to be served by one or more unit wells.37
The legislation defines "structure" as "a unique geologic feature that
potentially traps hydrocarbons in one or more pools or zones. "38
Before entering such an order, the Commissioner must find the fol
lowing based on evidence presented at a public hearing: the order is
reasonably necessary to prevent waste and the drilling of unnecessary
wells, and to encourage the development of the ultra deep structure;
the operations proposed by the party seeking unitization are economi
cally feasible; sufficient evidence exists to establish the limits of the
ultra deep structure; and the party seeking the unitization has submit
ted a reasonable development plan that states the number of wells
that the party intends to drill, an e stimated schedule for d rilling, and
the anticipated depth for each well.39 Each interested person is enti
tled to review all the information submitted, including any seismic
data submitted to establish the limits of the ultra deep structure.40
III.

RISK FEE STATUTE

When a compulsory drilling unit is created, the proceeds from oil or
gas produced from a unit well generally will be shared b y all persons
holding mineral rights in the unit.41 This rule can lead to a problem
when various tracts of land within the unit are subject to mineral
leases held b y different lessees. Suppose one lessee-operator is will
ing to drill a well, but another lessee is unwilling to participate by
paying a share of drilling costs. Absent some provision to address this
issue, there can be one of two results-either the non-participant's
decision leads to a stalemate, and no well is drilled or the operator
34. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 30:5 (2007).
35. LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 30:5.1 (West, Westlaw through 2012 Reg. Sess.).
36. The Acts of the Louisiana Legislature may be found at the legislature's website. The URL for that site is http://www.legis.state.la.us/.
37. § 30:5.l(B) (codifying this new section).
38. Drilling Permits, No. 795, sec. 1, § 28(2), 2012 La. Sess. Law Serv. 795 (West).
39. Id.

40. § 30:5.l(B)(7).

41. See LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 30:9 (2007).
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pays all the costs of drilling and thus bears all the risk of a dry hole.
Several states, including Louisiana, address this by Risk Fee Statutes.
Louisiana's Risk Fee Statute42 allows an operator to propose a well
to any other mineral lessees holding leases in the area.43 The operator
makes the proposal by sending specified information regarding the
proposed well to the other lessees, who have thirty days after receiv
ing the proposal to give a reply stating whether they consent to "par
ticipate" in the well.44 If a lessee timely agrees to participate, it
becomes obligated to pay its proportionate share of drilling costs and
will be entitled to its proportionate share of any proceeds from the
well, starting with the first drop of product.45 On the other hand, if
the lessee does not timely agree to participate, it will not be liable for
any costs in the event of a dry hole.46 The non-participating lessee
retains its right to receive its proportionate share of-production from
the proposed well, but it does not begin to share in such production
until the proceeds from production are sufficient to pay for the costs
of drilling and operating the well three times over.47
Act 743 amends Louisiana's Risk Fee Statute to require the opera
tor of a unit well to pay certain funds to the non-participating lessee
from the start of production, during the time that a non-participating
lessee would not have been entitled to receive any proceeds under the
pre-Act 743 version of the Risk Fee Statute.48 Namely, Act 743 re
quires the operator to pay the non-participating lessee a portion of the
proceeds of production sufficient to cover any lease royalties or over
riding royalties owed by the nonparticipating lessee on the
production. 49
IV.

PRE-ENTRY NOTICE TO SURFA CE OWNERS

Louisiana does not recognize mineral estates that create a perma
nent separation of surface rights and mineral rights, but the state rec
ognizes mineral servitudes.50 Mineral servitudes have many of the
characteristics of a mineral estate,51 but a mineral servitude generally
42. LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 30:10(A)(2)(a)(i) (West, Westlaw through 2012 Reg.
Scss.).
4J.
44.
45.

46.

Id. § 30:IO(A)(2).
Id. § 30:10(A)(2)(a)(ii).
Id. § 30:10(A)(2)(a)(i).
Id. § 30:IO(A)(2)(b)(i).
Id. § 30: IO(A)(2)(b) (stating

47.
that an operator may recover its costs plus a risk
fee equal t o twice its costs).
48. �ooling of Oil and Gas Wells, No. 743, 2012 La. Sess. Law Serv. 743 (West)
(amending§ 30:10(A)(2)(b)(ii)).
49. Id. at sec. I. § IO(A)(2)(b)(ii) (codified as amended at LA REV STAT ANN .
.
.
.
§ 30:10(A)(2)(b)(ii)).
50. Frost-Joh nson Lumber Co.v. Salling's Heirs, 91 So. 207, 245
(La. 1920); Wem
.
ple v. Nabors 011 & Gas Co., 97 So. 666, 668-69 (La. 1923).
SI. LA. REv. STAT. ANN .§§ 31:21to 31:23 (2007).
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will be extinguished by prescription of nonuse if it ever goes unused
for a ten-year period.52
A mineral servitude owner generally has a right to reasonable use
of the surface for the purpose of exercising his servitud e rights to ex
plore for o r produce minerals. 53 The servitude owner generally does
not need the landowner's permission to enter the property, but com
mon courtesy suggests that a servitude owner generall y should give
the landowner notice before he enters the property.
Under certain circumstances, legal notice will now be required. Act
795 enacts Louisiana Revised Statute 30:28(1), which requires that op
erators give notice to landowners at least thirty days prior to entering
their land t o drill. 54 The legislation does not require notice if the op
erator has a contract with the landowner, the operator is entering the
property only for pre-drilling acti vities (such as surveying), or the op
erator is drilling an additional well from an existing well pad and the
operator is not expanding the pad o r the access road to the pad.55 For
purposes of the pre-entry notice requirement, "surface owner" is de
fined as the person or persons s hown as the owner on the rolls of the
local property assessor.56
The Commissioner may grant a waiver of the thirty-day notice if
waiting thirty days to enter the land would result in termination of a
lease.57 The Commissioner may also waive the thirty-day requirement
in emergency circumstances.58
V.

LANDMEN AND UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE
OF LAW ALLEGATIONS

In Collins v. Godchaux, Collins was a landman who contracted to
manage the m ineral interests of two landowners in return for a speci
fied portion o f any mineral revenue they received.59 After the land
owners entered a settlement that resulted in an existing lease being
amended and five new leases being executed, Collins and the land
owners disagreed about Collins's right to a portion of the revenue the
landowners received from the new leases and the amended lease.60
Collins brought suit for the money he believed he was owed. 61 The
landowners filed a counterclaim, asserting that the work performed by
Collins constituted the unauthorized practice of law, and therefore
52. LA. REV. STAT. ANN.§ 31:27 (2007).
53. §§ 31:21, 31:23.
54. Drilling Permits, No. 795, 2012 La. Sess. Law Serv. 795 (West) (enacting
REv. STAT. ANN. § 30:28(1) (West, Westlaw through 2012 Reg. Ses s.)) .
55. Id. at sec. 1, § 28(1)(1)(c), (e)-(f) (codified at§ 30:28(I)(l)(c), (e)-(f)).
56. Id. at sec. 1, § 28(1)(2) (codified at § 30:28(1)(2)).
57. Id. at sec. 1, § 28(I)(l)(d) (codified at § 30:28(I)(l)(d)).
58. Id.
59. Collins v. Godchaux, 86 So. 3d 831, 832 (La. Ct. App. 2012).
60. Id. at 833 .
61. Id.

LA.
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they were entitled to a cancellation of their contract with Collins, as
well as a reimbursement of the money they had already paid him.6 2
In support of their counterclaim, the landowners noted that Collins
had negotiated contracts on their behalf.63 They also alleged that he
had advised them about their legal rights.64 The district court
agreed.65 It held that Collins had engaged in the unauthorized prac
tice of law and that his contract with the landowners was void.6 6 But
the court held that the landowners' "unclean hands" barred their re
covery of the money they already had paid to Collins.6 7
The Louisiana Third Circuit concluded that Collins had not given
legal advice.68 Further, the Third Circuit concluded, citing to prior
Louisiana Supreme Court opinions, that tasks which historically have
been performed by landmen do not constitute the "unauthorized prac
tice of law," even if some of those tasks appear to fit within Louisi
ana's statutory definition of that phrase.69 Because the tasks
performed by Collins were the types of tasks traditionally performed
by landmen, he had not engaged in the unauthorized practice of law.70
VI.

MANDATORY DISCLOSURE OF HYDRAULIC FRACTURING
FLUID COMPOSITION
A.

Regulation Mandating Disclosure

As reported in Texas Wesleyan's 2011 Oil & Gas Survey, the Louisi
ana Department of Natural Resources ("DNR") proposed a new reg
ulation that would require operators to disclose information about the
water used in hydraulic fracturing.71 The regulation, which went into
effect on October 20, 2011, requires operators to disclose on a well-by
well basis:
•
•

•
•

the volume of hydraulic fracturing fluid used;
the types of additives used (for example, biocides, corro
sion inhibitors, friction reducers, etc.), as well as the vol
ume of each type;
the trade name and supplier of each additive· and
a list of any chemical compounds contained \ n the addi
tives that qualify as hazardous under certain federal regu-

62. Id. at 834.
63. Id. at 835.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 834.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 839.
69. Id. at 838-39 � LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 37:212(A)(l)-(2) (Supp. 2012)
_
"unauthorized practice of law").
70. Collins. 86 So. 3d at 838-39.
71. LA. ADMIN. CODE tit. 43, pt. XIX § 118 (2011).

(defmmg
·
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lations, along with the maximum concentration of each
compound.72
The new regulation, found a t Louisiana Administrative Code
43.XIX.118, requires that the operator either include this information
with the Well History Report, which must be filed with the Office of
Conservation within twenty days after completion of the well, or sub
mit a statement that the inf ormation is posted on the FracFocus web
site that is operated by the Groundwater Protection Council.73 If the
identity of the chemical compound is a trade secret, the operator is
excused from identifying the compound but is required to identify the
chemical family to which the compound belongs.74
B.

Statute Mandating Regulation

The legislature enacted Act 812, which directs the Office to draft
regulations for mandatory disclosure of hydraulic fracturing fluid
composition-something that the Office had done even before Act
812 was passed.75 The statute mandates that the regulations require
disclosure within twenty days after completion of the hydraulic frac
turing operations, whereas the existing regulations require disclosure
within twenty days of completion of the well.76 Otherwise, Act 812
appears to mandate regulatory requirements consistent with the ex
isting regulations in Louisiana Administrative C9de 43.XIX.118.77
VII.

ACQUISITION OF PROPERTY FOR PIPELINES BY
EMINENT DOMAIN

Federal statutes and the statutes of many states provide procedures
for private companies to acquire property by eminent domain for cer
tain purposes, such as the construction of natural gas pipelines. The
owners from whom such property is acquired are entitled to compen
sation, but the process can proceed very quickly, and property owners
generally cannot block an acquisition. The process is called "condem-

72. Id.

73. Id.; see also LA. ADMIN. CoDE tit. 43, pt. XIX § 105 (2011) (setting the twenty
day deadline for filing the Well History Report).
74. LA. ADMIN. CODE tit. 43, pt. XIX § 118.
75. Hydraulic Fracturing, No. 812, 2012 La. Sess. Law. Serv. 812 (West) [herein af
ter Hydraulic Fracturing, No. 812]; LA. ADMIN. CoDE tit. 43, pt. XIX § 118.
76. Compare LA. ADMIN. CoDE tit. 43, pt. XIX § 118, with Hydraulic Fracturing,

No. 812.

77. LA. ADMIN. CooE tit. 43, pt. XIX §

118.
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nation" under federal law78 and the law of many states,79 but typically
is called "expropriation" in Louisiana.80

During its 2012 Regular Session, the Louisiana Legislature enacted
Act 702, which was signed into law by Governor Jindal.81 The Act
amends existing statutes regarding expropriation, including Louisiana
Revised Statutes 19:2 and 19:2.2.82 The amendments leave the power
of expropriation intact and attempt to ensure that the process of ex

propriation can still proceed relatively quickly, but the amendments
also take modest steps to protect landowners from unfairness in the
process.83
For example, prior law allowed a company that had the powe r of
expropriation (an "expropriating authority") to file a petition for ex
propriation whenever "a price cannot be agreed upon with the
owner. "84 Prior law did not require the expropriating authority to ne
gotiate with the landowner in good faith in an attempt to reach an
agreement with the landowner without resort to an expropriation ac
tion.85 Act 702 requires a company to make a "good faith" attempt to

reach an agreement with a property owner r egarding compensation
prior to filing an expropriation action.86 In those negotiations, the
company must offer compensation at least equal to the lowest ap
praised value of the property or property rights to be acquired.87

Prior law did not require an expropriating authority to give a land
owner a reasonable period to consider the authority's offer to
purchase the property.88 Act 702 provides that, at least thirty days
before filing an expropriation action, the expropriating authority must
send a letter to the property owner by certified mail, stating (1) the

�

egal basis by which the company could exercise expropriation author
ity; (2) the purpose and conditions of the proposed acquisition of
pr? perty; and (3) the compensation the company proposes to pay.89

With the letter, the authority also must include a copy of all appraisals
that the company has obtained of the property to be acquired; a plat

78. See, e.g.. Mars. & Ne. Pipeline, L.L.C. v. Deccoulas 146 F. App'x 495 496 (1st
Cir. 2005); m cilso 15 U.S.C. § 717f (2006).
79. s('(', e.g Tt'.X. Gov'T CODE ANN. § 2206.00I(c)(7)(a) (West 2008 & Supp.
2012); T�x. Gov'T Coot.: ANN.§ 2206.051 (Supp. 2012).
'

'

.•

80. Se<' LA. Rt'V. STAT. Ar:iN. § 19:2 (West. Westlaw through 2012 Reg. Sess.).
81. Press Release. La. Office of the Governor, Governor Jindal Signs Bills and

Issues Veto� s (Ju�c 15. 2012), http://www.gov.louisiana.gov/index.cfm?md=newsroom
&tmp=deta1l&art1clclD=3480.
82 .
xpropriation. No. 702. 2012 La. Sess Law Serv. 702 (West).

\1·1• �
:

.

.

8.l .'i<•e 1d.
84. § 19:2.
85. St'<' id; .H'<' a/.w LA. REv. STAT. ANN.§ 19:2.2 (West, Westlaw current through

2012 Reg. Scss.).
86. See Expropriation. No. 702.

87. See id.
See § 19:2; see also § 19:2.2.
89. Expropriation. No. 702.

HR
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showing the boundaries of the proposed acquisition; a description of
any proposed above-ground facilities that the company proposes to
place on the property and the location where the facilities will be lo
cated; and a statement of the "considerations for the proposed route
or area to be acquired."90

VIII. CONTAMINATION LITIGATION (AiKlA "LEGACY

L ITIGATION")

Since the Louisiana Supreme Court decision in Corbello v. Iowa
Production,91 p laintiffs have filed a large number of "legacy litigation"
actions, asserting that their property w as contaminated by past oil and
gas activity.92
As the number of those suits began to multiply, people began to
express concern that plaintiffs could receive large money judgments
that were based on the estimated cost of remediating property, but
that plaintiffs were not required to spend the money on remediation.93
Thus, the contamination might remain a threat to the environment.
And, if a plaintiff failed to use a money judgment to clean-up his
property, a company that already had paid that judgment might face
the possibility of having to pay again-this time, for a clean-up or
dered by regulators.94 Another concern was that plaintiffs' experts
and defendants' experts often expressed very different opinions about
what type o f clean-up was appropriate, and jurors and judges who
lacked expertise in environmental science were being called upon to
choose between such competing t estimony.

In its 2006 Regular Session, the Louisiana Legislature
312, which addresses these two concerns.95 It established

enacted Act
a process by
which the Louisiana Office of Conserv ation would hold hearings and
issue its opinion regarding what clean-up was appropriate.96 Al90. Id.
91. Corbello v. Iowa Prod., 850 So. 2d 686 (La. 2003).
. .
92. In Marin v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 48 So. 3d 234, 238 n.l (La. 2010), the �u1s1-

ana Supreme Court stated: "Legacy litigation" refers to hundre�s of cases filed by
.
landowners seeking damages from oil and gas explorat10n compames for alleged envi
ronmental damage in the wake of this Court's decision in Corbello v. Iowa Produc
tion. These types of actions are known as "legacy litigation" because they often arise
from operation s conducted many decades ago, leaving an unwanted "legacy" in the
form of actual or alleged contamination. See Loulan Pitre, Jr., "Legacy Litigation"
and Acts 312 of 2006, 20 TuL. ENVTL. L.J. 347, 347-49 (2007).
.
93. In her c o ncurring opinion in M.J. Farms, Ltd. v. Exxon Mobil. Corp., Justice
Johnson noted that the legislature's intent i n enacting "Act 312" was to require that
damages awards be spent on clean-up. 998 So. 2d 16, 39 (La. 2008) (Johnson, J.,

concurr ing).
94. Although the concern about double exposure heightened after �he number ?f
legacy litigation cases increased, the conce�n had be�n expressed �arher, s�c� as m
the concurring opinion of Justice Lemmon m Magnolia Coal Terminal v. Ph1l/1ps 011
Co., 576 So. 2d 475, 486 (La. 1991) (Lemmon, J., concurring).
. .
95. Remediation, No. 312, 2006 La. Sess. Law Serv. 312 (West) (cod1f1ed at LA.
REv. STAT. ANN. § 30:29 (West, Westlaw through 2012 Reg. Sess.)).

96.

Id.
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though parties could offer their own remediation plans, the Office of
Conservation's plan might provide some guidance to the judge or
jury.97 Second, assuming a defendant was found liable and that it pa
a money judgment, the money would have to be spent on c l ean-up.
But a number of other issues remained unresolved, some of which
were spawned by Act 312 itself.

��

A.

Act 779-Reforms Relating to Procedure and
Admissions of Liability

During its 2012 Regular Session, the Louisiana Legislature adopted
two bills to address legacy litigation issues.99 One of the issues ad
dressed by the legislation was one that sometimes has been disputed
by parties in legacy litigation-whether a party has the right to sub
poena employees of the Office of Conservation or Department of
Natural Resources in order to compel testimony about their work in
helping the Office devise a recommendation for a remediatio n plan. 100
Act 779 enacts a new section of Louisiana Revised Statute 30:29 that
authorizes parties in legacy litigation to subpoena any Office "em
ployee, contractor, or representative" f o r testimony at a deposition or
trial if that person was involved in formulating the remediation plan
recommended by the Office. 101
Another issue of controversy is the large number of defendants
named in legacy lawsuits. Plaintiffs often name many-sometimes
dozens-companies and individuals as defendants in legacy litiga
tion. '02 and in some cases, the plaintiffs may not have evidence to link
some of the defendants to the alleged contamination. Act 779 estab
lishes a procedure whereby a defendant may request a hearing at
which the plaintiff has the initial burden of introducing evidence of
environmental damages.103 If the plaintiff introduces such evidence,
the defendant has the burden of establishing the lack of a genuine
issue of material fact regarding whether the defendant is legally re
sponsible for the contamination.104
97. Ste id.
98. Id.
99. Ste Remediation of Oilfield Sites and Exploration Sites and Production Sites.

No. 779, 2012 La. Sess. Law Serv. 779 (West); Liability for Environmental Damage,
No. 754, 2012 La. Sess. Law Serv. 754 (West).
100. Stt. t.g.. Tensas Poppadoc. Inc. v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 49 So. 3 d 1020,
1024-26 (La. 2010). writ granted and cast remanded, 58 So. 3d 473 (La. 2011 ).
IOI. See Remediation of Oilfield Sites and Exploration Sites and Production Sites
No. 779 (amending LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 30: 29 (West, Westlaw through 2012 Reg

Scs..-;.)).
I 02. For example. the plaintiffs named "[a]pproximately 25 defendant s."
Farms. Ltd . v E�xon Monil Coll? . 998 So. 2d 16, 20 n.2 (La. 1991).
.

.

:

M.J.

.
103. Rcmcd1a1ton of Oilfield Sites and Exploration Sites and Production Sites
' No

779.

104. See id.

.

.
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If a defendant establishes the absence of a genuine issue of material
fact, the court must dismiss that defendant without prejudice.105 If
another party later discovers evidence that the dismissed defendant
may have liability, the party may cause the dismissed defendant to be
rejoined to the litigation.106 If the dismissed defendant is never re
joined, the defendant is entitled to a dismissal with prejudice when the
litigation ends in a final, non-appealable judgment.107
Louisiana has a relatively short limitations period for tort claims
one year.108 Although the running of the limitations period may be
suspended by the discovery rule, Louisiana jurisprudence provides
that the limitations period begins to run as soon as a plaintiff knows
facts that w ould cause a reasonable person to inquire about potential
harm, even if the plaintiff does not yet have facts sufficient to point to
a particular defendant.109 Act 779 provides running o f the limitations
period is s uspended for one year if a person who suspects his property
is contaminated submits to the Office of Conservation a "notice of
intent to investigate" that meets certain requirements.110
Act 779 also contains other provisions. For example, the Act pro
hibits parties from engaging in ex parte communications with the Of
fice of Conservation during the time that the Office is considering
proposed remediation plans.111 The Act authorizes the Office to issue
compliance orders for remediation after a person admits liability or is
found liable for contamination.112 Finally, if a party admits liability,
the Act requires that party to waive any contractual indemnification
rights it might have for any punitive damages arising from the
contamination.113

105. See id.
106. See id.
107. See id.
108. See LA. CJv. CooE ANN. art. 3492 (2011) (one-year prescriptive period for
delictual actions); see also LA. C1v. CooE ANN. art. 3493 (2011). A "delictual action"
is a tort action. Terrebonne Parish Sch. Bd. v. Columbia Gulf Transmission Co., 290
F.3d 303, 311 ( 5th Cir. 2002). In Louisiana, limitations periods that correspond to
what many jurisdictions would call a "statute of limitations" are called a period of
"liberative prescription." See LA. CJv. CooE ANN. art. 3447 (2007).
109. M arin v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 48 So. 3d 234, 245-46 (La. 2010). Under Louisi
ana jurisprudence, the "discovery rule" is one of four categories of contra non
valentem, a doctrine which can suspend the running of liberative prescription. Id.
110. See Remediation of Oilfield Sites and Exploration Sites and Production Sites,
No. 779.

111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id.
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Act 754-Additional Provision s Relating to Procedure and
Admissions of Liability

The other legislation relating to legacy litigation was Act 754, which
4
enacts Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure articles 1552 and 1563.11
Parties in legacy litigation sometimes have disputes regarding testing
and inspection of allegedly contaminated property. Act 754 permits
any party, or the Louisiana Department of Natural Resources
("LDNR"), to request that the court direct attorneys for the parties in
legacy litigation to appear before LDNR to develop an environmental
management order that authorizes all parties to have access to the
property for inspection and testing and establishes time periods and
protocols for testing and inspection.11 5 Such an order must provide
that any test results must be disclosed to all parties and LDNR within
thirty days.116 If the test results are not disclosed, the party that failed
to disclose the results is barred from offering the results into
evidence.117
Another issue has been whether defendants could pay for a
remediation or admit liability for contamination without admitting lia
bility for other damages claimed by plaintiffs. Act 754 permits de
fendants to admit responsibility for implementing a plan to evaluate,
and if necessary, remediate all or a portion of any contamination with
out admitting liability for other alleged damages. 11 8 Once a party ad
mits liability for remediation, the matter is referred to LDNR for a
public hearing on the most feasible plan for a remediation.1 19
C.

Sub sequent Purchaser Doctrine

When a person purchases property that contains contamination that
is not readily apparent, and the seller does not expressly assign to the

huycr any claims against third parties for damages arising from the
Does the buyer have a cause of action against third
parties? Under the "subsequent purchaser doctrine," the cause of ac
tion against third parties would remain with the seller, and the buyer
would not have such a cause of action. Until recently, it was unclear
whether the subsequent purchaser doctrine applies under Louisiana
l w.1211
a
co n t.aminati on ,

114. L iah i lity for Environmental Damage, No. 754, 2012 La. Sess. Law Serv. 754
.
(West) (amcndm� LA. Com; C1v. PRoc. ANN. art. 1552,
1563).
115.
I lt1.
117.
IIX.
IIY.

/ti.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

120. Ser Marin .v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 48 So.
3d 234, 256 n.18 (La. 2010). Th e
C .ou rt noted that.'' ha� granted revi
�� in part to add r ess whether the subsequent
· ·1.�cr doctrine apphes ndcr Lou1s1ana law, but
pur�h.
that the co urt ultim ately had not
�
rcachcd the '�'uc hccausc 1t had resolved the case on
other grounds. Id.
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In Eagle Pipe & Supply Co. v. Amerada Hess Corp., the Louisiana
Supreme Court resolved the question, at least with respect to tort
claims, by holding that the subsequent purchaser doctrine applies.121
In Eagle Pipe, the plaintiff purchased land that previously had been
used for the removal of scale from the interior of oilfield piping.122
Such scale sometimes contains naturally occurring radioactive mate
rial ("NORM") that originates from the formations from which oil or
gas is produced. Subsequent to the purchase, the Louisiana Depart
ment of Environmental Quality perf o rmed an inspection and discov
ered the land was contaminated with NORM.123 The contamination
had not been readily apparent.124
The plaintiff brought a claim against the seller.125 The plaintiff also
brought claims against various trucking companies that allegedly had
transported pipes to the site and against several oil and gas companies
that allegedly owned the pipes that were cleaned at the site.126 The
Court held that a cause of action for contamination generally belongs
to the person who owned the land at the time of contamination, and,
absent an a s signment of the cause of action, a subsequent purchaser
has no right of action against third parties, such as the trucking com
panies and oil and gas companies that might have fault for the con
tamination.127 The Court expressly noted, however, that it was not
expressing an opinion on whether a similar result would apply in a
case involving defendants that were parties to a mineral lease relating
to the contaminated land.128
D.

Extent of Remediation Damages

In Louisiana v. Louisiana Land & Exploration Co., the State of
Louisiana and the Vermilion Parish School Board filed three lawsuits,
seeking remediation of certain public properties that the plaintiffs al
leged had been contaminated by the oil and gas activity of UNOCAL
and other defend ants.129 UNOCAL admitted responsibility. UNO
CAL then filed a motion for a partial summary judgment, stating that
Act 312 limited its liability to the amount of money needed to fund a
"feasible plan" approved by the court pursuant to Louisiana Revised
121. Eagle Pipe & Supply Co. v. Amerada Hess Corp., 79 So. 3d 246 (La. 2011).
122. Id. at 253-54.
123. Id. at 254.
124. Id. at 257.
125. Id. at 253.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 283.
128. See id. at 281 n.80.
129. See Louisiana v. La. Land & Exploration Co., 85 So . 3d 158 (La. Ct. App.).
writ granted. 92 So. 3d 340 (La. 201 2).
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Statute 30:29. 1 30
appealed. 13 1
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The court granted the motion, and the plaintiffs

The Third Circuit examined the language o f Revised Statute 30:29,
including 30:29(H), which states in part:

This Section shall not preclude an owner of land from pursuing a
judicial remedy or receiving a judicial award for private claims suf
fered as a result of environmental damage, except as otherwise pro
vided in this Section. Nor shall it preclude a judgment ordering
damages for or implementation of additional remediation in excess
of the requirements of the plan adopted by the court pursuant to
this Section as may be required in accordance with the terms of an
express contractual provision.132
The "plan adopted by the court" refers to a plan to remediate the
property to regulatory standards.
Some readers of the statute might conclude that, because t h e statute
expressly allows claims for remediation in excess of the regulatory
standard whenever a more rigorous remediation is "required [by] an
express contractual provision," the statute implies that claims for a
more rigorous remediation are not allowed i n the absence of an e x 
press contractual provision. The Third Circuit concluded, however,
that the statute should be interpreted otherwise. 1 33 The Third Circuit
stated that, La R.S. 30:29, by its clear language, provides for a land
owner to recover damages in excess of those determined in the feasi
ble plan whether they be based on tort or contract law." 1 34 The Third
Circuit therefore reversed the trial court's j udgment that the defend
ants' liability was limited to funding the "feasible plan" approved by
the court pursuant to Louisiana Revised Statute 30:29. u:i;
.

"

The Louisiana Supreme Court has agreed to review the Third Cir
cuit's ruling.1.�
IX.

SECTION 16 MINERAL RIGHTS

"Section 16" lands are certain lands formerly owned by the federal
government that the United States has transferred to the states for the
purpose of supporting public schools. D7 In Louisiana, the state has
r � t ained ownership of Section 16 land 1 JS but a Louisiana statute pro
.
vides th �t each pansh school board has the right, in its own name, to
�rant mineral leases covering any such lands within the school board's
,

I JO. Id. RI I �9.
I J I . 1'/. RI 1 60.
I J� . Id. al 1 6 1 -62.
l .H Id. RI l 62 6J .
I .'-I l1J. R I 162.
I J�. Id.
l .lti L.oui�iana ... . �- Land & Exploralion Co 92 So. 3d 340 (La. 20 1 2)
1.'7. \ crm 1on Pan5h Sch. Bd. v. ConocoPhillips Co 83 So. 3d 1234.
1 237-38 (La.
n. App. 20 1 ... ) .
I J� .'it'r id. al I 2Jt(.
-

�

.

.•

.

.•
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parish. 139 Further, a school board has the right to keep all revenue
from such l eases.140
In late 2005 and early 2006, the Vermilion Parish School Board
("VPSB " ) brought three related actions, asserting that various de
fendants had u nderpaid it for royalties owed on mineral leases VPSB
had granted for Section 16 l ands.141 The alleged underpayments re
lated to oil produced during the early 1 990s, more than ten years
before VPSB filed suit.142 This l e d to a potential timeliness issue be
cause the general limitations period for royalty claims i n Louisiana is
three years. 143
Further, for several years, VPSB had been aware of facts that would
make it difficult for VPSB to reasonably assert that the running of the
limitations period had been suspended by the discovery rule-indeed,
VPSB even tually stipulated in e a ch of the three cases that the discov
ery rule would not apply and that its royalty claims were time-barred
unless the claims were immune from "liberative prescription,"144 the
equivalent of a statute of limitations. 1 45 The defendants asserted that
the claims were not immune from prescription because, although the
state itself is immune from prescription, that immunity does not ex
tend to local government or political subdivisions, such as school
boards. 1 46 Each of the three cases was before a different district court
judge, and each dismissed the VPSB's claims, holding that the claims
were not immune from prescription and that the claims therefore
were time-barred.147
On appeal, VPSB did not assert that it was entitled to immunity
from prescription in its own right. 148 VPSB argued, however, that it
1 39. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 30:152 (2007).
1 40. LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 30:154 (Supp. 2012).
1 4 1 . See ConocoPhillips, 83 So. 3d at 1 236. The Author of this A rticle was lead
for ConocoPhillips Co., the primary defendant in one of the three cases, and
lead counsel for Louisiana Land & Exploration Co. in one of the other two re·

counsel

was

lated cases.
1 42 . Id.
1 43. LA. Ctv. CooE ANN. art. 3494 (20 1 1 ).

144. The fact is not readily apparent from the Louisiana Third Circuit's opinion:
stated in a brief filed by ConocoPhillips, and is not disputed in either the
Board"s original brief or reply brief. Compare Brief for Appellee at l. Vermilion
Par is h Sch. Bd. v. ConocoPhillips Co 83 So. 3d 1234 (2012) (No. 1 1 -009999-CA).
20 1 1 WL 5 1 1 7380, with Brief for Appellant at 6, Vermilion Parish Sch. Bd. v. Co
nocoPhillips Co., 83 So. 3d 1234 (201 1 ) (No. 1 1 00999· CA ), 20 1 1 WL 4826847, and
Reply Brief for Appellant at 5, Vermilion Parish Sch. Bd. v. ConocoPhillips Co., 83
So. 3d 1 234 (201 1 ) (No. 1 1-00999-CA), 201 1 WL 5563588.
1 45. LA. C1v. CooE ANN. art. 3447 (20 1 1 ) .
1 46 . La. Dep't of Transp. v. City of Pineville, 403 So. 2d 49, 53 (La. 198 1 ) .
147. ConocoPhillips, 83 So. 3d at 1 234 (Judge Everett): Id. at 1 23 6 (dismissal of all
three cases based on prescription); Vermilion Parish Sch. Bd. v. Amerada Hess Corp ..
83 So. 3d 1 242 , 1 242 (La. Ct. App. 20 1 2 ) (Judge Trahan): Vermilion Parish Sch. Bd. v.
UNOCAL Corp., 83 So. 3d 1242, 1242 (La. Ct. App. 2012) (Judge Duplantier).
148. On appeal, the parties' briefing n arrowed the issues relating to the VPSB"s
assertion that it was immune from prescription. See Brief for Appellee at I . Vermilhut it is

.•

-
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was not asserting claims on behalf of itself.149 VPSB argued that the
statute that gives school boards the authority to grant mineral lea� es
in their own names for Section 1 6 lands does not grant executive

rights to school boards.150 Instead, it merely makes school boards the
Moreover, argued VPSB , the statute
_
that gives school boards the right to keep all revenue from Section 16

leasing agents for the state.151

mineral leases does not grant certain mineral rights to school
boards. 1 52 Instead, it appropriates certain money-the state's Section

16 mineral lease revenue-to school boards. 1 53 Thus, argued VPSB ,

the royalty claims asserted by VPSB were royalty claims that be
longed to the state, not VPSB, and VPSB was asserting claims on be
half of the state. 1 54 The Louisiana Third Circuit agreed, holding that
the royalty claims were immune from prescription . 1 55 The appellate
court therefore reversed the dismissals of each of the three cases and
remanded for further proceedings. 1 56

X.

C LAIMS BY UNLEASED OWNERS

In Wells v. Zadeck, an unleased mineral rights owner brought a

claim for proceeds from production that were owed to him, but which

had never been paid to him.157 The parties disputed the timeliness of
the plaintiff's claim. 1 58 In resolving the issues before it, the Louisiana
Supreme Court held that a claim by an unleased owner is a quasi
contractual claim that is governed by the ten-year prescriptive period
established by Civil Code article 3499, rather than the three-year pre
scriptive period established for royalty claims by Civil Code article
3 494 . 1 59
ion Parish Sch. Bd. v. ConocoPhillips Co., 83 So. 3d 1234 (2012) (No. 1 1 -009999-CA),
20 1 1 W L 5 1 .1 7 �80 For ex ample, Civil Code article 3494, the provision that imposes a
:
.
three-year hm.itat10ns penod for royalty claims, states that the article does not apply
_
to roy alty claims denved
from "state owned property." One might think that the
_
prov1s1on might help VPSB given that the state owns Section 16 lands. But the de
fendants argued that lease royalties derive from ownership of mineral rights, not from
mere ownership of land , and that the phrase "state owned property"
means state
.
owned mmeral n& hts, not state owned land. By the time the cases
were on appeal,
.
VPSB was not senously contestmg the defendant s' reading of
Civil Code article 3494.
149. ConocoPhillips, 83 So. 3d at 1 24 1 .
1 50. Id. a t 1 237.

1 5 1 . Id. at 1240.
1 52. Id. at 1 239.
1 53 . Id. at 1 240.

1 54. Id. at 1237.
155. Id. at 1 241 .
� 56. Id. ; Vermi lion Paris � Sch. B � l v. Amera da Hess
Corp., 83 So. 3d 1242 1242
.
(La. Ct. App. 2012); Verm1 hon Pansh Sch. B d . v.
UNOC AL Corp . , 83 So . 3 d , 1242,
1 242 (La. Ct. App. 201 2) .
1 5 7 . Wells v. Zadeck 89 So. 3d 11 45, 1 1 46 (La. 201
2).
,
1 58. Id. a t 1 1 46-50.
1 59. Id.

